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Realism Over Formalism and the Presumption of Constitutionality:
Chief Justice Roberts’ Opinion Upholding the Individual Mandate
Wilson Huhn*

Introduction
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,1 Chief Justice John Roberts
cast the deciding vote to uphold the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act. Speaking
for the Court in Part III-C of his opinion, Roberts found that the individual mandate was properly
enacted pursuant to the General Welfare Clause.2 Two aspects of his opinion in particular drove
this result. In deciding whether the individual mandate constitutes a “tax” within the meaning of
the Constitution, the Chief Justice engaged in realistic analysis rather than legal formalism.3 In
addition, Roberts reasoned that, if fairly possible, the statute had to be construed in such a way as
to render it constitutional.4 The confluence of realist analysis and the presumption of
constitutionality resulted in a decision ruling that the Court should uphold the individual mandate
as a proper exercise of Congress’s power to tax.5
Part I of this essay discusses the significance of this ruling in light of its political,
medical, and economic consequences. Parts II and III contrast the formalist approach used by
Justice Roberts in finding that the individual mandate was not a “tax” within the meaning of the
Anti-Injunction Act with the functional approach he used in finding that the individual mandate
is a tax for purposes of the General Welfare Clause. Part IV describes how Justice Roberts
deferred to Congress in considering the constitutionality of the individual mandate.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS CASE
On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of all but one provision
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).6 The Court issued its decision in a
set of consolidated appeals under the title National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius. The opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in this landmark case is the only opinion to even
*
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1

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).

2

Id. at 2594-2601.

3

Id.

4

Id.at 2600-02.

5

Id.at 2601.

6

See id. at 2608 (upholding the entirety of the Affordable Care Act except for a provision that would have allowed
the federal government to withhold funding from the existing Medicaid program from any state that declined to
enroll in the expanded Medicaid program).
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partially command a majority of the justices. Four justices joined Part II and Part III-C of
Roberts’s opinion in finding that the federal Anti-Injunction Act did not apply7 and in upholding
the constitutionality of the “individual mandate,” the requirement that all American citizens must
have health insurance.8 Moreover, it appears that the rest of Roberts’s opinion constitutes the
narrowest grounds for the Court’s decision upholding the expansion of Medicaid:9 ruling that the
States are free to opt out of Medicaid expansion without losing existing funding10 and finding the
remainder of the PPACA is “severable” from the single provision that was struck down.11
Accordingly, even though the remainder of Roberts’s opinion is not joined by a majority of the
justices, it may have precedential weight under Marks v. United States.12
The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case is of the utmost significance in a number of
respects. Politically, universal health care has long been the holy grail of progressives in
America.13 The road toward universal health care had been slow but steady. In 1965, Congress

7

See id. at 2582-84 (finding that the individual mandate is not a “tax” within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction
Act).
8

See id. at 2594-2600 (upholding the individual mandate as a “tax” within the meaning of the General Welfare
Clause).
9

See id. at 2603 (upholding the expansion of the Medicaid program).

10

See id. at 2601-07 (striking down a provision of the Act that permitted the federal government to withhold
existing Medicaid funding from a state that refused to expand its Medicaid program).
11

See id. at 2607-08 (finding the remainder of the Act to be severable from the unconstitutional provision).

12

See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977) (in the case of a split majority, the narrowest reasoning
of the Justice supplying the decisive vote should be considered the reasoning of the Court.). See also Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2585-93 (Roberts, C.J.) (finding that Congress lacked the power under the Commerce
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact the individual mandate). In Part III-A of his opinion the Chief
Justice ruled that the individual mandate exceeded Congress’s power to enact legislation under the Commerce
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, a conclusion that the four dissenting justices also arrived at. It is not
clear whether this portion of the opinion represents a holding of the Court or whether it is obiter dictum. Compare
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2600-01 (Roberts, C.J.) (contending that it was necessary to determine
whether the individual mandate was constitutional under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause in
order for the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to apply to the analysis under the General Welfare Clause), with
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2629 fn. 12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating,
“I see no reason to undertake a Commerce Clause analysis that is not outcome determinative.”).
13

See Zoe Clark, Congressman Dingell: “I know my father who started this fight is smiling from up above", MICH.
RADIO NEWS FOR MICH. (June 28, 2012, 1:30 AM), http://michiganradio.org/post/congressman-dingell-i-know-myfather-who-started-fight-smiling-above; Julie Rovner, Rep. Dingell: The House's Link To Health-Care History, NPR
(Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120159308. Rovner states:
Dingell's quest for universal health care began in 1932, when his father, John Dingell Sr.,
was first elected to the House from Michigan. The elder Dingell quickly became one of the
architects of the New Deal.
… In 1943, the elder Dingell, along with Senators Jim Murray of Montana and Robert
Wagner of New York, introduced the first national health insurance bill. The so-called WagnerMurray-Dingell bill was fought over for years, though it never became law.
And when the elder Dingell died in 1955, John Dingell Jr. took over not only his father's
seat, but also his quest for national health insurance.
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enacted Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for the indigent,14 and over the years it has
continuously expanded both of those programs.15 Congress has also adopted several laws
expanding protection for persons who have employer-provided health insurance, including
ERISA (1974),16 COBRA (1985),17 and HIPAA (1996).18 But the premise of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act is that every American should have access to comprehensive,
high-quality health care through the subsidized purchase of affordable health insurance.19
Generations of Americans have struggled to extend adequate health care to the working class.20
This law is a very substantial step towards the ultimate goal of universal health care.
From the standpoint of public health, the United States ranks 37th in the world.21
According to numerous studies, our nation trails nearly every other industrialized country in
measures such as expected lifespan and infant mortality.22 One leading study states “[i]t is hard
14

See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 2863 (July 30, 1965).

15

See, e.g., Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066
(Dec. 8, 2003) (expanding Medicare coverage for prescription drugs).
16

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (Sept. 2, 1974) (regulating
the operation of employer health benefit plans).
17

Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (Apr. 7, 1986)
(entitling employees to purchase continuing health insurance coverage after termination of employment).
18

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (Aug. 21, 1996)
(improving medical privacy and limiting restrictions that group health plans can place on coverage for preexisting
conditions).
19

See Barack Obama, President Obama Signs Health Reform into Law, THE WHITE HOUSE (March 23, 2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/president-obama-signs-health-reform-law#transcript (stating,
“And we have now just enshrined, as soon as I sign this bill, the core principle that everybody should have some
basic security when it comes to their health care.”).
20

See id. President Obama stated:
I’m signing this bill for all the leaders who took up this cause through the generations -- from
Teddy Roosevelt to Franklin Roosevelt, from Harry Truman, to Lyndon Johnson, from Bill and
Hillary Clinton, to one of the deans who’s been fighting this so long, John Dingell. (Applause.)
To Senator Ted Kennedy. (Applause.) And it’s fitting that Ted’s widow, Vicki, is here -- it’s
fitting that Teddy’s widow, Vicki, is here; and his niece Caroline; his son Patrick, whose vote
helped make this reform a reality. (Applause.).

See also note 13 supra and accompanying text.
21

See World Health Org., World Health Report 2000, WORLD HEALTH ORG., available at
http://www.who.int/whr/2000/en/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
22

See Org. for Econ. & Coop. Dev., Health Status, OECD.STAT EXTRACTS,
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=HEALTH_STAT. (last visited Oct. 28, 2012) (showing lower life
expectancy and higher infant mortality for Americans compared to the people of other industrialized countries);
Ellen Nolte & Martin McKee, Variations in Amenable Mortality—Trends in 16 High-Income Nations, 103 HEALTH
POL’Y 47, 47-52 (Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/In-theLiterature/2011/Sep/Variations-in-Amenable-Mortality.aspx (showing that America had the highest rate of
“amendable mortality” that is, deaths that could have been prevented with appropriate health care); The
Commonwealth Fund, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: How the Performance of the U.S. Health Care System Compares
Internationally, 2010 Update, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (June 23, 2010), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/Fund-Reports/2010/Jun/Mirror-MirrorUpdate.aspx?page=all [hereinafter Mirror, Mirror 2010].
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to ignore that in 2006, the United States was number 1 in terms of health care spending per
capita but ranked 39th for infant mortality, 43rd for adult female mortality, 42nd for adult male
mortality, and 36th for life expectancy.”23
The PPACA holds out the promise of alleviating the suffering of tens of millions of Americans.24
In addition, for better or for worse, this massive piece of legislation will also have dramatic
economic consequences for the United States. The health care industry constitutes one-sixth –
soon to be one-fifth – of the American economy.25 It represents the largest component of
government spending and is the principal driver of government budget deficits.26 Over sixty
percent of bankruptcies in the United States are caused in substantial part by health care costs.27
Because the cost of health insurance has risen far faster than income,28 there has opened a
23

Christopher J.L. Murray & Julio Frenk, Ranking 37th — Measuring the Performance of the U.S. Health Care
System, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2010 98, 98-99 (January 14, 2010), available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0910064#t=article.
24

See Cathy Schoen, Michelle M. Doty, Ruth H. Robertson & Sara R. Collins, Affordable Care Act Reforms Could
Reduce the Number of Underinsured U.S. Adults by 70 Percent, 30(9) HEALTH AFF. 1762, 1762-71 (Sept. 2011),
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/In-the-Literature/2011/Sep/Reduce-Uninsured.aspx
[hereinafter Reduce Underinsured].
25

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §1501(a)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 119, 243 (Mar.
23, 2010) (stating, “Health insurance and health care services are a significant part of the national economy.
National health spending is projected to increase from $2,500,000,000,000, or 17.6 percent of the economy, in 2009
to $4,700,000,000,000 in 2019); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, LETTER TO HONORABLE NANCY PELOSI,
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE RECONCILIATION
LEGISLATION COMBINED WITH H.R. 3590 AS PASSED BY THE SENATE (MARCH 18, 2010), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11355/hr4872.pdf (showing health care spending is expected to grow to over
20% of American economy by 2020).
26

See Christopher Chantrill, US Health Spending, GOV’T SPENDING IN AM.,
http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/us_health_care_spending_10.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012) (showing
health care expenditures as the largest single expenditure in federal spending); Andrew J. Rettenmeier, Health Care
Spending Forecasts, NAT’L CTR. FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS (April 23, 2009), http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba654.
Rettenmeier states:
Given that 45 percent of health care spending is currently funded by government payers, future
budget implications are staggering. For example, in addition to dedicated payroll taxes and
premium payments, federal spending on Medicare will:
•

Require funding equal to 36 percent of federal income taxes by 2030, based on the CMS
forecast; and

•

Require funding equal to almost 70 percent of federal income taxes by midcentury, based
on the CBO forecast.

27

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §1501(a)(2)(E) (stating, “Half of all personal bankruptcies are
caused in part by medical expenses.”); David U. Himmelstein, Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren & Steffi
Woolhandler, Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National Study, 122(8) AM. J. MED. 741,
741-46 (2009), available at http://www.pnhp.org/new_bankruptcy_study/Bankruptcy-2009.pdf (stating, “62.1% of
all bankruptcies in 2007 were medical; 92% of these medical debtors had medical debts over $5000, or 10% of
pretax family income.”).
28

See Kaiser Fam. Found., Employer Health Benefits 2012 Annual Survey, (Slides 59, 4) available at
http://ehbs.kff.org/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 Annual Survey].
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yawning gap between high-income and low-income Americans in their access to health care.29
The United States spends twice as much per capita on health care as other countries but the
members of its workforce have shorter lives and are less healthy while they are alive.30
These problems have to be resolved or the United States will cease to be economically
competitive with other nations.
In spite of the serious – even grave – medical and economic challenges that the PPACA
was designed to address, the constitutionality of the “individual mandate,” a key provision of the
Affordable Care Act, was challenged, not on realistic grounds, but for semantic and formalistic
reasons. In his interpretation of the General Welfare Clause, Chief Justice Roberts rejected these
formalistic approaches to constitutional interpretation. He upheld the individual mandate
because he chose to focus on the law’s actual operation, not the label that Congress attached to
it. His analysis made constitutionality turn upon the actual effect of the law, not the category
that it might be relegated to.
Furthermore, in his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly acknowledged the limited
role that the courts must play in determining the constitutionality of laws like this.31 In cases
affecting the constitutional rights of individuals or relatively powerless minority groups, the
courts must play a vital role.32 In such cases, the courts must stand between the government and
its citizens, and carefully scrutinize laws that threaten our individual rights or unfairly
discriminate against classes of persons.33 But economic legislation is presumed constitutional
because the adoption of economic policy is a legislative and not a judicial function.34 The
purpose of economic policy is to adjust and compromise the interests of various groups in
society, and the courts are institutionally incapable of making such adjustments and
29

See Sara Collins, Michelle Doty, Ruth Robertson & Tracy Garber, Help on the Horizon: How the Recession Has
Left Millions of Workers Without Health Insurance, and How Health Reform Will Bring Relief - Findings from The
Commonwealth Fund Biennial Health Insurance Survey of 2010, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (March 16, 2011),
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Fund-Reports/2011/Mar/Help-on-theHorizon.aspx?page=all [hereinafter Help on the Horizon].
30

See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text. See also Mark Pearson, Written Statement to Special Senate
Commission on Aging: Disparities in health expenditure across OECD countries: Why does the United States spend
so much more than other countries?, ORG. FOR ECON. & COOP. DEV. (September 30, 2009), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/34/43800977.pdf.
31

See notes 88-104 infra and accompanying text.

32

See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938) (announcing that, while the
constitutionality of economic legislation is to be evaluated under the rational basis test, laws affecting political
rights, infringing the protections of the Bill of Rights, or invading the rights of “discrete and insular” minority
groups, would “be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny”).

33

See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503-07 (1965) (invoking “strict scrutiny” in striking down a
state statute making it illegal to use birth control); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-71 (1966)
(invoking strict scrutiny in striking down state poll tax); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (employing
“intermediate scrutiny” in declaring that it was unconstitutional for a public university to refuse to admit women).
34

See, e.g., Carolene Products, 304 U.S., at 152 (stating, “[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators.”).
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compromises.35 The decision of the Supreme Court in this case reflects the fundamental
principle that the courts are prohibited from resolving questions of economic policy. Instead,
these questions represent political judgments that are committed to the legislative process.
I. THE INTRODUCTION TO CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’ OPINION
The introductory portion of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion is written for a general
audience. This portion of Roberts’ opinion is joined by no other justice, and does not directly
address the issue before the Court: the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.36 However,
Roberts’ introductory remarks may well be remembered long after the nation has ceased to
discuss the constitutionality of universal health care legislation.
This portion of Roberts’ opinion is a primer on the structural principles of the United
States Constitution – the concepts of federalism, enumeration of powers, and separation of
powers.37 It is clear, concise, and convincing. It deals with the fundamental principles of
American Constitutional Law, yet it is written in such a simple, straightforward style that it could
be included in a textbook for elementary school students. Chief Justice Roberts’ language is not
poetic or uplifting. He lacks the eloquence of Louis Brandeis, Oliver Wendell Holmes, or Robert
Jackson. But while he may not inspire, he does inform.
Furthermore, in the introduction Roberts foreshadows his ruling upholding the
Affordable Care Act.38 Notice how the following passage references not only the constitutional
limits on the power of Congress but also the limits on the power of the courts:
In our federal system, the National Government possesses only
limited powers; the States and the people retain the remainder.
Nearly two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall observed that
“the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted”
to the Federal Government “is perpetually arising, and will
probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.”
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819).
In this case we must again determine whether the Constitution
grants Congress powers it now asserts, but which many States and
individuals believe it does not possess. Resolving this controversy
requires us to examine both the limits of the Government’s power,
and our own limited role in policing those boundaries.39

35

See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) (stating, “The conflicts of economic interest between the
regulated and those who advantage by it are wisely left under our system to resolution by the Congress under its
more flexible and responsible legislative process. Such conflicts rarely lend themselves to judicial determination.”).

36

See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2577-80 (2012).

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id. at 2577.
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In the course of the introduction, Chief Justice Roberts discusses the handful of
enumerated powers of Congress that are relevant to this case.40 In addition to Congress’s power
to regulate economic activity under the Commerce Clause41 and its power to enact
supplementary legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause,42 Roberts offered this pithy
explanation of Congress’s power under the General Welfare Clause – commonly known as the
“power of the purse:” “Put simply, Congress may tax and spend. This grant gives the Federal
Government considerable influence even in areas where it cannot directly regulate. The Federal
Government may enact a tax on an activity that it cannot authorize, forbid, or otherwise
control.”43
Near the close of his introductory remarks, Chief Justice Roberts describes the limited
role that the courts must play in ruling on the constitutionality of laws such as the Affordable
Care Act.44 Roberts observes that questions of policy are to be determined by the political
branches in accordance with the political choices of the citizenry:
Members of this Court are vested with the authority to interpret the
law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make
policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation’s
elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people
disagree with them. It is not our job to protect the people from the
consequences of their political choices.45
Roberts’s deference to Congress in this case was enough to tip the scales in favor of the
law.
The following portions of this article describe the contrasting approaches that Justice
Roberts followed and the contradictory results he reached in deciding whether the individual
mandate is a “tax” for statutory and constitutional purposes.
II. ROBERTS’ TEXTUAL APPROACH TO INTERPRETATION OF THE ANTIINJUNCTION ACT
In Part II of his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts ruled that the federal Anti-Injunction Act
does not bar the courts from hearing this case.46 The four concurring justices joined this portion
of his opinion,47 and the four dissenting justices came to the same conclusion.48 In this portion
40

Id. at 2577-80.

41

See id. at 2578-79.

42

See id. at 2579.

43

Id.

44

See id. at 2579-80.

45

Id. at 2579.

46

See id. at 2582-84.

47

See id. at 2609.
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of his opinion Chief Justice Roberts avoids policy analysis and instead looks to the text of the
statute and the intent of Congress to determine the meaning of the law.49
The federal Anti-Injunction Act50 prohibits the courts from hearing lawsuits challenging
tax laws until the taxes are paid. If the Anti-Injunction Act had applied to this case, the plaintiffs
could not have filed suit until 2014 when the penalty for failing to have health insurance goes
into effect.51 Both sides in this dispute wanted the courts to determine the constitutionality of the
Affordable Care Act before 2014.52 Because both plaintiffs and defendants took the position that
the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply, the Supreme Court appointed amicus counsel to formulate
the strongest arguments in support of the proposition that the Act does apply and that the courts
are prohibited from considering challenges to the Act at this time.53
In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret both the
Affordable Care Act and the Anti-Injunction Act. Chief Justice Roberts first addressed the
textual argument made by amicus counsel:
Amicus contends that the Internal Revenue Code treats the
penalty as a tax, and that the Anti-Injunction Act therefore bars this
suit.
The text of the pertinent statutes suggests otherwise. The
Anti-Injunction Act applies to suits “for the purpose of restraining
the assessment or collection of any tax.” §7421(a) (emphasis
added). Congress, however, chose to describe the “[s]hared
responsibility payment” imposed on those who forgo health
insurance not as a “tax,” but as a “penalty.” §§5000A(b),
(g)(2). There is no immediate reason to think that a statute
applying to “any tax” would apply to a “penalty.”
Congress’s decision to label this exaction a “penalty”
rather than a “tax” is significant because the Affordable Care
Act describes many other exactions it creates as “taxes.”54
(emphasis added)
Justice Roberts pointed out that the language of the Internal Revenue Code acknowledges
the distinction between a tax and a penalty:
48

See id. at 2655-56.

49

See id. at 2582-84.

50

26 U.S.C.A. § 7421(a) (West 2006).

51

See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2582.

52

See id.

53

See id.

54

Id. at 2582-83.
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In light of the Code's consistent distinction between the terms
“tax” and “assessable penalty,” we must accept the Government's
interpretation: § 6201(a) instructs the Secretary that his authority to
assess taxes includes the authority to assess penalties, but it does
not equate assessable penalties to taxes for other purposes.55
The court-appointed amicus attorney urged the Court to adopt a “functional” definition of
whether the individual mandate constitutes a tax: “Amicus argues that even though Congress did
not label the shared responsibility payment a tax, we should treat it as such under the Anti–
Injunction Act because it functions like a tax.”56
Chief Justice Roberts rejected this “functional approach” to interpreting the meaning of
the Affordable Care Act and the Anti-Injunction Act.57 Instead, Roberts looked to more standard
forms of statutory construction: legislative intent and the text of the statute.58 Statutes are the
voice of the people governing themselves, and, in the interpretation of statutes, the courts must
respect the intent of people’s elected representatives.59 In attempting to discern Congress’s
intent in the interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act, Justice
Roberts looked primarily to the statutory text, calling it the “best evidence of Congress’s intent”:
“The Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act, however, are creatures of Congress’s
own creation. How they relate to each other is up to Congress, and the best evidence of
Congress’s intent is the statutory text.”60 (emphasis added)
Accordingly, in Part II of his opinion, Justice Roberts utilized a textual approach to
statutory interpretation in ruling that the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act is not a
tax within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act.61 However, in Part III-C of his opinion, the
Chief Justice ruled that the individual mandate is a tax within the meaning of the General
Welfare Clause!62 In arriving at this conclusion, Justice Roberts adopted a completely different
interpretive approach. In place of a formalistic approach that focused on the words of the statute
or the intent of Congress, Justice Roberts looked to how the law functions – the operation and
effect of the law.

55

Id. at 2584.

56

Id. at 2583.

57

Id. at 2583-84.

58

Id.

59

See, e.g., Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 28-29 (7th ed.
2007). The authors state:
An overwhelming majority of judicial opinions considering statutory issues are written in the
context of legislative intent. The reason for this lies in an assumption that an obligation to construe
statutes so that they carry out the will, real or attributed, of the lawmaking branch of the
government is mandated by principles of separation of powers.
60

See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2583.

61

Id. at 2583-84.

62

Id. at 2600.
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III – ROBERTS’ “FUNCTIONAL APPROACH” TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE
As noted above, in Part II of his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts ruled that the individual
mandate is not a “tax” within the meaning of the federal Anti-Injunction Act.63 However, in Part
III-C of his opinion, Roberts found that the individual mandate is a “tax” within the meaning of
the General Welfare Clause.64 How did he arrive at this seemingly contradictory result?
This very point was raised at oral argument by Justice Samuel Alito in his questioning of
Solicitor General Robert Verrilli:
JUSTICE ALITO: General Verrilli, today you are arguing that the penalty is not a
tax [under the Anti-Injunction Act]. Tomorrow you are going to be back and you
be arguing that the penalty is a tax [under the General Welfare Clause]. Has the
Court ever held that something that is a tax for purposes of the taxing power
under the Constitution is not a tax under the Anti-Injunction Act?65
General Verrilli’s response to Justice Alito may not be in the hard-hitting style that
appeals to emotion and excites partisans,66 but it is honest, nuanced, and elegant. Verrilli
conceded that the Court had never ruled that a law could be a tax for purposes of the General
Welfare Clause and not a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, however, he distinguished
questions of statutory interpretation from questions of constitutional interpretation:
GENERAL VERRILLI: No, Justice Alito, but the Court has held in a (sic) license
tax cases that something can be a constitutional exercise of the taxing power
whether or not it is called a tax. And that's because the nature of the inquiry that
we will conduct tomorrow is different from the nature of the inquiry that we will
conduct today. Tomorrow the question is whether Congress has the authority
under the taxing power to enact it and the form of words doesn't have a
dispositive effect on that analysis. Today we are construing statutory text where
the precise choice of words does have a dispositive effect on the analysis.67
In deciding whether the Anti-Injunction Act applied to this case, Justice Roberts observed
that this was a matter that was committed solely to Congress.68 The Court had to determine
63

Id. at 2583-84.

64

Id. at 2600.

65

Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012) 2012 WL
993811, at *1.
66

See John M. Broder, Vindication for Maligned Lawyer in Yesterday’s Decision, N.Y. Times, June 29, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/30/us/in-health-ruling-vindication-for-donald-verrilli.html (stating that after oral
argument “legal commentators heaped scorn on [Verrilli], declaring his performance a ‘train wreck’ and a
‘flameout,’ and he was lampooned by Jon Stewart”).
67

Transcript of Oral Argument at 31-32, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11398), 2012 WL 993811, at *1.
68

See text accompanying note 61 supra.
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whether Congress intended to postpone judicial review of the individual mandate of the
Affordable Care Act until 2014. It was a matter of congressional intent, and in resolving this
question, the Court was necessarily bound by the words of the relevant statutes.69 On the other
hand, whether the General Welfare Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress to enact the
Affordable Care Act is ultimately not a question of statutory construction but rather a matter of
constitutional interpretation. The General Welfare Clause states: “The Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States ….”70
This provision of the Constitution grants Congress the power to “lay and collect taxes.”71
The constitutionality of the individual mandate depends upon whether it is or is not a tax, and
that determination is not up to Congress. As Chief Justice Roberts noted, if Congress were to
enact a law without indicating whether it was a tax, the courts would obviously have to
determine whether it was a tax in determining whether it was a proper enactment under the
General Welfare Clause.72 Roberts offered the following example:
An example may help illustrate why labels should not control here.
Suppose Congress enacted a statute providing that every taxpayer
who owns a house without energy efficient windows must pay $50
to the IRS. The amount due is adjusted based on factors such as
taxable income and joint filing status, and is paid along with the
taxpayer’s income tax return. Those whose income is below the
filing threshold need not pay. The required payment is not called a
“tax,” a “penalty,” or anything else. No one would doubt that this
law imposed a tax, and was within Congress’s power to tax.73
Roberts then noted that such a law would be a “tax” for constitutional purposes even if
Congress called it a “penalty.”74 Earlier in his opinion, Roberts had observed “Congress cannot
change whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty for constitutional purposes simply by describing
it as one or the other.”75
In Part II of his opinion, dealing with statutory construction of the Affordable Care Act
and the Anti-Injunction Act, Justice Roberts had emphasized the importance of the “label” that
Congress attached to the law:

69

See text accompanying note 61 supra.

70

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

71

Id.

72

See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2597-98.

73

Id.

74

Id.at 2598 (stating, “That conclusion should not change simply because Congress used the word “penalty” to
describe the payment.”).
75

Id. at 2583.
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Congress's decision to label this exaction a “penalty” rather than a
“tax” is significant because the Affordable Care Act describes
many other exactions it creates as “taxes.” Where Congress uses
certain language in one part of a statute and different language in
another, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally.76
However, in Part III of his opinion, dealing with the constitutionality of the individual
mandate, Justice Roberts repeatedly and emphatically rejected the contention of the dissent that
the question could be determined solely by reference to the “label” that Congress attached to this
enactment. Roberts stated:
It is of course true that the Act describes the payment as a
“penalty,” not a “tax.” But while that label is fatal to the
application of the Anti–Injunction Act, it does not determine
whether the payment may be viewed as an exercise of Congress's
taxing power. It is up to Congress whether to apply the Anti–
Injunction Act to any particular statute, so it makes sense to be
guided by Congress's choice of label on that question. That choice
does not, however, control whether an exaction is within
Congress's constitutional power to tax.77
The Chief Justice’s “functional approach” consisted of three separate arguments. First,
he listed several ways in which the individual mandate “looks like a tax:”78
The exaction the Affordable Care Act imposes on those without
health insurance looks like a tax in many respects. The “[s]hared
responsibility payment,” as the statute entitles it, is paid into the
Treasury by “taxpayer[s]” when they file their tax returns. It does
not apply to individuals who do not pay federal income taxes
because their household income is less than the filing threshold in
the Internal Revenue Code. For taxpayers who do owe the
payment, its amount is determined by such familiar factors as
taxable income, number of dependents, and joint filing status. The
requirement to pay is found in the Internal Revenue Code and
enforced by the IRS, which—as we previously explained—must
assess and collect it “in the same manner as taxes.” This process
yields the essential feature of any tax: it produces at least some
revenue for the Government. Indeed, the payment is expected to
raise about $4 billion per year by 2017.79

76

Id. (citation omitted).

77

Id. at 2594 (internal citation omitted).

78

Id.

79

Id. (citations omitted).
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In the second passage, Justice Roberts identified three factors that distinguish a “tax”
from a “penalty,” and found that the individual mandate satisfied all three elements.80 A “tax,”
reasoned Justice Roberts, is in an amount that is not so large as to utterly discourage the activity
altogether; it is collected by the taxing authorities; and it is imposed on a strict liability basis
regardless of the taxpayer’s state of mind or level of culpability.81
The individual mandate meets all three of these elements: the amount that is due is far
less than the cost of health insurance,82 the amount is collected by the Internal Revenue
Service,83 and the amount is owed if the taxpayer does not have health insurance, regardless of
whether this omission was intentional, knowing, reckless, negligent, or without any fault of the
taxpayer.84
In the third passage that betokened a “functional approach” Justice Roberts concluded
that the individual mandate is not a “penalty” because under the Affordable Care Act people who
decline to obtain health insurance are not considered “outlaws.”85 Instead, the Affordable Care
Act gives people the choice of either obtaining health insurance or paying the amount
specified.86 This means that the individual mandate was a tax on certain conduct rather than a
penalty for violating the law.87
Another factor that determined the result in this case is that the Chief Justice gave the
statute the benefit of the doubt. Roberts’ deference to Congress is the subject of the next portion
of this essay.
IV. ROBERTS’ DEFERENCE TO CONGRESS IN DETERMINING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
One of the most significant factors that drove the Court to acknowledge the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act is the deference that the Court showed to Congress.
Chief Justice Roberts invoked two principles that contributed to this deference: the canon of

80

See id. at 2595-96.

81

See id. at 2595.

82

See id. at 2595-96.
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See id. at 2596.

84

See id.

85

Id. at 2596-97. Justice Roberts stated:
Indeed, it is estimated that four million people each year will choose to pay the IRS rather than
buy insurance. See Congressional Budget Office, supra, at 71. We would expect Congress to be
troubled by that prospect if such conduct were unlawful. That Congress apparently regards such
extensive failure to comply with the mandate as tolerable suggests that Congress did not think it
was creating four million outlaws. It suggests instead that the shared responsibility payment
merely imposes a tax citizens may lawfully choose to pay in lieu of buying health insurance.

86

See id.

87

See id.at 2596-2600.
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constitutional avoidance and the principle that questions of policy are for Congress and not the
courts to determine.
American courts have the power of “judicial review” – the authority to declare statutes
unconstitutional.88 But the principle of Separation of Powers cautions respect for the people’s
political choices and places a brake on the power of judicial review. One doctrine that was relied
upon in this case was the interpretive canon of “constitutional avoidance.” This is the guideline
that instructs the courts to, if possible, construe a statute in such a way as to render it
constitutional. As Chief Justice Roberts said, “[I]t is well established that if a statute has two
possible meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that
does not do so.”89 Roberts quoted well-known passages by Justices Joseph Story and Oliver
Wendell Holmes in support of this proposition.90
In this case, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance enabled the Court to uphold the
individual mandate as a tax. Roberts explained that even though this might not be “the most
natural interpretation of the mandate,” nevertheless the Court had the duty to ask whether it was
“fairly possible” to construe that requirement to be a tax:
[I]f the mandate is in effect just a tax hike on certain taxpayers
who do not have health insurance, it may be within Congress's
constitutional power to tax. The question is not whether that is the
most natural interpretation of the mandate, but only whether it is a
“fairly possible” one. As we have explained, “every reasonable
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality.” The Government asks us to interpret the
mandate as imposing a tax, if it would otherwise violate the
Constitution.91
Roberts added, “[g]ranting the Act the full measure of deference owed to federal statutes,
it can be so read….”92

88

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-79 (1803) (declaring the power of the courts to strike down laws that
are unconstitutional); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2579-80 (acknowledging the same).
89

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2593.

90

Id. Roberts stated:
Justice Story said that 180 years ago: “No court ought, unless the terms of an act rendered
it unavoidable, to give a construction to it which should involve a violation, however
unintentional, of the constitution.” Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 448–449, 7 L.Ed. 732 (1830).
Justice Holmes made the same point a century later: “[T]he rule is settled that as between two
possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other
valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.” Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142,
148, 48 S.Ct. 105, 72 L.Ed. 206 (1927) (concurring opinion).
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Id. at 2594 (citations omitted).
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Id.
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Roberts’s invocation of “constitutional avoidance” to preserve the individual mandate of
the Affordable Care Act is at all not surprising. In recent years, the Supreme Court has
frequently construed statutes so as to preserve their constitutionality.93 For example, in 2009 in
Northwest Austin Utility District No. One v. Holder,94 the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Roberts, narrowly construed a provision of the 1965 Voting Rights Act in order to avoid striking
it down as unconstitutional.95 In his opinion for the Court in Northwest Austin, Justice Roberts
acknowledged that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance arises from the respect that is due
Congress as a coequal branch:
We fully appreciate that judging the constitutionality of an Act of
Congress is “the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is
called on to perform.” “The Congress is a coequal branch of
government whose Members take the same oath we do to uphold
the Constitution of the United States.”96
The doctrine of constitutional avoidance is not the only interpretive principle that
restrained the Court’s power of judicial review in this case. Of equal or greater importance is the
principle that the courts must defer to Congress on matters of economic policy, and the
individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act represents a fundamental decision affecting
national economic policy. The ACA seeks to regulate myriad aspects of the health care industry,
which constitutes one-sixth of the American economy.97 Nor was this policy choice lightly
taken. Congress and the American people have struggled with the problem of expanding access
to health care for generations and spent more than a year debating the contours of the ACA.98
Nor was the policy choice simple and straightforward. The ACA contains hundreds of
provisions, representing myriad and complex compromises, balancing the interests of consumers,
providers, employers and insurers.99 This law is fraught with vast consequences (for good or ill)
for the American people.
Over a century ago, in his dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York,100 Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes eloquently expressed the principle that economic policy is to be determined by
the people acting through the legislative branch, not by the courts in the interpretation of the
Constitution:
93

See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 2929-30 (2010) (narrowly construing a federal criminal fraud
statute to preserve its constitutionality against a vagueness challenge).
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Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One. v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
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See id. at 206-11.
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Id. at 204-05 (citations omitted).
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See note 25 supra.
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See notes 13, 20 supra.
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See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2670 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) (describing the “complex” interrelated provisions of the law and stating, “the Act attempts to achieve
near-universal health insurance coverage by spreading its costs to individuals, insurers, governments, hospitals, and
employers—while, at the same time, offsetting significant portions of those costs with new benefits to each group.”).
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Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down maximum hour law as unconstitutional).
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[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the
citizen to the state or of laissez faire. It is made for people of
fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding
certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking,
ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether
statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the
United States.101
After 1937, the Supreme Court embraced Holmes’s understanding of the Constitution and
it has reiterated this principle innumerable times.102 At several points in his opinion, Justice
Roberts acknowledged that questions of policy are left to Congress, not to the courts. In the
introduction to his opinion Roberts stated:
Our permissive reading of these powers is explained in part by a
general reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation's elected
leaders. “Proper respect for a coordinate branch of the
government” requires that we strike down an Act of Congress only
if “the lack of constitutional authority to pass [the] act in question
is clearly demonstrated.” Members of this Court are vested with
the authority to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise
nor the prerogative to make policy judgments. Those decisions are
entrusted to our Nation's elected leaders, who can be thrown out of
office if the people disagree with them. It is not our job to protect
the people from the consequences of their political choices.103
Deferring to Congress, Justice Roberts concluded that the individual mandate could
reasonably be construed as a tax, and that it was constitutional.104
CONCLUSION
Chief Justice John Roberts upheld the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act
because he rejected formalism and embraced realism in constitutional analysis, and because he
deferred to Congress, acknowledging its right to make policy choices.
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Id. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (“We have returned to the original constitutional
proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who
are elected to pass laws.”). See generally Brief for Constitutional Law and Economics Professors as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 2, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566,
(2012) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 135046, at *i (contending that “[t]he principle of Separation of Powers requires the
courts to defer to Congress on questions of economic policy.”).
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See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2579 (citation omitted).

104
Id. at 2608 (stating, “In this case, however, it is reasonable to construe what Congress has done as increasing
taxes on those who have a certain amount of income, but choose to go without health insurance. Such legislation is
within Congress’s power to tax.”).
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There are several other significant aspects of Justice Roberts’ ruling upholding the
individual mandate. For instance, Justice Roberts reaffirmed the principle that Congress has the
power to impose “regulatory taxes” under the General Welfare Clause,105 and he contended that
the power to tax is narrower than the power to regulate106 – but those points will have to be
addressed in another article.
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See id. at 2596 (stating, “Indeed, “[e]very tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes an
economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed.” Sonzinsky, supra, at 513, 57 S.Ct.
554. That [the individual mandate] seeks to shape decisions about whether to buy health insurance does not mean
that it cannot be a valid exercise of the taxing power.”).
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See id. at 2600 (stating, “although the breadth of Congress's power to tax is greater than its power to regulate
commerce, the taxing power does not give Congress the same degree of control over individual behavior.”).
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